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i 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Docket No. 15159 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
This is an action by Redman Warehousing Corporation 
against the several defendants seeking reimbursement for expenses 
Redman incurred in preserving and protecting property stored in 
Redman's warehouse which property was damaged in floods at the 
Freeport Center on the 13th and 19th of July, 1973. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Surranary Judgment has been granted against plaintiff-
appellan t and in favor of defendant Clearfield City Corporation 
(hereinafter Clearfield) which decision is not appealed. Summary 
Judgment was later granted to defendant-respondent Freeport 
Center (hereinafter Freeport Center) which is the subject of 
this appeal. The case still pends in the lower court against 
defendant Whirlpool Corporation. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the Order Granting Sum. 
mary Judgment in favor of Freeport Center. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-appellant is a Texaa corporation engaged ir I 
the warehousing business in the State of Utah. (R 1) I I 
- t ston: i 
substantial amounts of property for defendant Whirlpool Corpor;.( 
tion (R. 4, 20) which sustained water damage in two separate : 
floods on July 13 and 19, 1973. Plaintiff incurred $33 ,480.57
1 in expenses in preserving, protecting and res taring the water· : 
damaged property (R. 3, 29). On December 6, 1973, plaintiff : 
filed its Complaint (R. 18, reverse side) seeking reimbursemen~ I' 
from Whirlpool Corporation, Clearfield and/or Freeport Center I 
in the sum of $28,480.57, or $33,480.57. (R. 5) Summons were 1 
prepared and mailed to the Davis County Sheriff's Office on I 
December 16, 1974 (R. 323), and defendant Clearfield was sernc: 
on December 23, 1974 (R. 324). The Record does not indicate I 
when defendant Whirlpool was served, but the fact that Whirlpoc:I, I 
was served is shown by Whirlpool's Answer filed January 6, 19;: I 
(R. 20, reverse side) The litigation thereafter actively pro· I 
s t .1.I 
ceeded between appellant, Whirlpool and Clearfield. On ep e-'i 
27, 1976, a Summons was issued (R. 204) and the Surmnons and 
Septet· I Complaint were served upon defendant Freeport Center on I 
ber 29, 1976. (R. 205) Freeport Center filed its Answer and 
Cross-Claim on October 26, 1976 (R. 206) The Answer did not 
I 
I 
2 
_J 
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raise the defense of insufficiency of process (R. 206-210), nor 
did any motion pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. The Answer did, however, raise the affirma-
tive defense of Statute of Limitations (R. 206) On February 4, 
1977, defendant Freeport Center filed a Motion to Amend its 
Answer so as to raise the defense of insufficiency of process. 
(R. 297, 298) That Motion has never been granted by the lower 
Court. Defendant Freeport Center filed its Motion for Summary 
Judgment and supporting Memorandum on the same date. (R. 303-308) 
Appellant submitted its Memorandum in Opposition to defendant's 
motion on March 18, 1977. (R. 319-325) The 'motion was argued 
and granted on March 22, 1977, Judge Wahlquist presiding. (R. 326) 
The Order r.ranting Defendant Associates' Motion for Summary Judg-
ment was entered March 25, 1977. (R. 327-328) Appellant timely 
filed Notice of Appeal. (R. 338). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF FREEPORT CENTER 
Freeport Center's position which the trial court fol-
lowed was that even though plaintiff's Complaint was filed well 
within the applicable limitations period, its failure to have 
summons issued as against Freeport Center within three months of 
the filing of the Complaint retroactively nullified the Complaint 
for Statute of Limitations purposes. The lower Court clearly 
3 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
erred in sustaining this position for both substantive and pre. 
cedural reasons. First, in Utah, the filing of a complaint 
alone tolls the Statute of Limitations. It is not necessary 
for Statute of Limitations purposes, that summons be issued 
within three months or any other time, however important the , 
I 
three-months issuance requirement may be in other contexts ! 
(Point II below). Second, plaintiff was not required to issue I 
summons as to defendant Freeport Center within three months, \ 
as this is a multiple-defendant case wherein issuance within I 
three months is required only as to one defendant under the I 
applicable Utah Rule of Civil Procedure. As the Record shows, i 
issuance was so obtained as to both of Freeport Center's co- I 
defendants (Point III below) . Furthermore, Freeport Center die I 
not properly raise its claim from a procedural point of view, I 
because pleading the affirmative defense of Statute of Limita· 
tions does not call into question the sufficiency of process. 
Since the defense of insufficiency of process was not pleaded, 
it was waived, and could not be used in support of the Statute 
of Limitations defense (Point IV below). For any or all of 
these reasons, the lower court's judgment should be reversed 
and the cause remanded for trial. 
POINT II 
THIS ACTION IS NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
In Utah, filing the Complaint in an action tolls the 
4 
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Statute of Limitations with respect to any defendant named 
therein whether served with Surnmons or not. Since the Complaint. 
naming Freeport Center Associates in the instant case was filed 
on December 6, 1974, it is immaterial whether a three- or a 
six-year statute applies since any statute was tolled approxi-
mately one year-and-a-half after the cause of action arose. 
In Askwith v. Ellis, 85 U. 103, 38 P.2d 757 (1934), 
the Utah Supreme Court held that it was not necessary to do any 
more than file a Complaint to toll the Statute of Limitations. 
The plaintiff in that case had filed a complaint which laid 
dormant for seven years. No sU1m11ons was issued within three (3) 
months nor service made within one (1) year as required by the 
then applicable procedural rule. That rule (Section 104-5-5 
R.S. Utah, 1933) is substantially identical to the present 
Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which contains 
the same time limitations. After seven years, the plaintiff 
filed an amended complaint and issued and served Surnmons thereon. 
Defendant moved to strike the amended complaint. The lower court 
denied the motion but held the amended complaint had actually 
commenced a new action and ordered plaintiff to pay a new filing 
fee. Defendants then successfully demurred to the "new" cause 
of action on the ground that it was barred by the Statute of 
Limitations. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, relying heavily 
on Section 104-5-1 R.S. Utah, 1933, which provided that an 
action could be commenced either by service of surnmons or by 
5 
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the filing of the complaint. Rule 3 (a) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure also so provides: 
A civil action is commenced (1) by 
filing a complaint with the court, 
or (2) by the service of summons. 
Since in Askwith the action was commenced by the filing of the 
original complaint within the period required by the Statute 
0
: 
Limitations, and remained pending because nothing was affirma. 
tively done to put it out of court, the Statute of Limitations 
did not bar the action. 
The Askwith case clearly states the Utah rule: The 
filing of a complaint alone tolls the Statute of Limitations. 
Since in the instant case, the complaint was filed well within 
the statutory period, the lower court erred in ~ranting Summa~ 
Judgment based on the Statute of Limitations defense. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT FREEPORT CENTER ASSOCIATES WAS PROPERLY SERVED 
Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure reads 
in full as follows: 
If an action is commenced by the filing 
of a complaint, summons must issue there-
on within three months from the date of 
such filing. The summons must be served 
within one year after the filing of the 
complaint, or the action will be de~med 
dismissed, provided that in any action 
brought against two or more defendants 
in which personal service has been ob-
tained upon one of them within the vear, 
the other or others may be served or 
6 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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appear at any time before trial. 
(emphasis added) 
The obvious purpose of the exception in multiple defendant 
cases is to make the conduct of multiple party lawsuits more 
efficient. It permits plaintiffs to file actions naming all 
possible defendants at the outset, and then to initially pro-
ceed against those most implicated by the available evidence. 
Remaining defendants can then be served as the evidence develops 
in the course of discovery. To effectuate the purpose of the 
multiple defendants exception, the earlier Rule 4(b) requirement 
that summons be issued within three months of the filing of the 
complaint cannot be interpreted to require that summons issue 
within three months as to each defendant in a multiple-defendant 
case. Such an interpretation cuts the heart out of the multiple-
defendant exception. It would be operative only in the rare case 
that the process server could not effectuate service within the 
one vear period otherwise applicable. It could not have been 
the intent of those who so carefully drafted the Rule 4(b) mul-
tiple defendant exception that it be undermined by an unwarranted 
construction of the three-month issuance requirement. 
Rule 4(b) states that: 
If an action is commenced by the filing 
of a complaint, summons must issue there-
on within three months from the date of 
such filing . . 
The Rule does not state "summons must issue thereon as to each 
defendant within three months . " In this case, summons did 
7 
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issue within three months of the filing of the complaint. Th; I 
Record shows that the comp lain t was filed December 6, 1974 
I 
(R. 18, reverse side); that summons were prepared and mailed 
to the Davis County Sheriff's Office on December 16, 1974 I 
I 
Clearfield was served on Decembe: I (R. 323); and that defendant 
23, 1974 (R. 324). As such, plaintiff complied with the lit· 
eral requirements of Rule 4(b) in multiple-defendant cases by 
successfully obtaining personal service upon at least one defo.I 
I dant, and serving all others before trial. Since the service 
upon defendant Freeport Center was entirely proper, the lower 
court erred in granting their Motion for Sunnnary Judgment. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT WAIVED ANY CLAIM BASED ON INSUFFICIENCY OF PROCESS 
The basis of defendant's Statute of Limitations defe:: 1 
is the purported insufficiency of the process served on them 
September 29, 1976. It is fundamental that claims against the 
sufficiency of process will be waived if not timely asserted, 
either by way of 12(b) (4) motion or in defendant's Answer. Vt;'. 
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b) and (h). Defendant's Answer fi'.: 
October 26, 1976, pleaded the affirmative defense of Statute o'. 
Limitations, but did not raise insufficiency of process. There· 
fore, defendant has waived any defense or contention based on 
insufficiency of process. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 12(h). 
The Utah Rules clearly do not contemplate that an 
attack on the insufficiency of process can be made pursuant to 
8 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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I 
I 
I 
I 
an answer pleading only Statute of Limitations. Statute of 
Limitations is recognized as an affirmative defense in Utah 
I ' Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c). Insufficiencv of process is 
I 
I 
treated separately in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(4) 
as a defense which can be raised, at the pleader's option, by 
motion or by answer. Implicit in this scheme is the recogni-
tion that pleading the Statute of Limitations as a defense does 
not call into question the sufficiency of process. 
The Askwith case, earlier cited, supports this posi-
tion. In that case, plaintiff filed his original complaint in 
1923. It laid dormant for seven years, at which time plaintiff 
filed an amended complaint and caused service to be issued upon 
it. The defendant moved to strike the amended complaint. The 
trial court denied the motion, but held the amended complaint 
was a new cause of action, and required a new filing fee to be 
paid. The defendant then made a general appearance and demurred 
to the complaint on the ground that it was barred by the Statute 
of Limitations. The demurrer was sustained by the trial court, 
but reversed on appeal. The Utah Supreme Court found against 
the defendant on the Statute of Limitations issue as earlier 
noted, but was careful to distinguish the insufficiency of pro-
cess question: 
Had they [defendants] appeared speci-
ally with a motion to quash service of 
summons because not made within the 
year from the time the action was com-
menced, such motion might have been 
9 
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good. It may also be that defen-
dants could have ignored the service 
of summons, on the ground that the 
return showed on its face that it 
was a nullity and could not vest the 
court with jurisdiction of defendants. 
But they did neither. They made no 
attack on the process by which it was 
sought to subject them to the juris-
diction, which they may have done spec-
ially, but attacked the complaint it-
self--the jurisdiction of the court 
over the res. They did not deny the 
jurisdiction of the court, but invoked 
it in their own behalf. They asked 
the court to exercise its power and 
jurisdiction on the action itself in 
their behalf. A party cannot invoke 
the jurisdiction of a court and at the 
same time deny he is in court . . . 
Askwith v. Ellis, 85 U. 103, 38 P.2d 
757 at 759 (1934). 
Precisely the same thing has happened here. Defendant Associa::I 
appeared generally by answering and moving for su=ary judgmer.: I 
I 
By so appearing, it has w,aived any claims based on insufficiencl 
of process. 
Indeed, the Statute of Limitations is of no signifi· 
cance in the case at bar. The service of September 29, 1976, 
was valid, and the action was commenced December 6, 1974, weli : 
within the limitations period. Thus, defendant's real defense 1' 
was directed to the validity of service, which defense was not 
timely asserted and therefore waived. 
CONCLUSION 
There are three sufficient reasons why the lower cou:: \ 
I 
judgment should be reversed. 
10 
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First, the filing of the complaint tolled the Statute 
of Limitations. 
Second, the service upon defendant Associates was 
entirely in keeping with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Third, defendant Associates was precluded from arguing 
any asserted deficiencies in service because it waived them by 
entering a general appearance. 
IT IS THEREFORE RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, that the lower 
Court's Order Granting Summary Judgment in favor of Defendant 
Associates be reversed, and the cause be remanded for trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Nelson, Harding, Richards, 
Leonard & Tate 
48 Post Office Place 
P. 0. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorneys for Appellant 
11 
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I The undersigned hereby certifies that he delivered r 
a copy of the attached APPELLANT'S BRIEF to Mr. Peter W. Billin,( 
. ''f Jr. , at the law firm of Fabian & Clendenin at 800 Continental I 
Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, this ;)_').___ dayof( 
__ ::\)...._,µ,"""\'--'v.__ __ , 19 77 . \ 
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